SonicNudge: 推定器-制御器結合によるホバリングUAVの制御変位攻撃
SonicNudge: Controlled Displacement of Hovering UAVs via Estimator-Controller Coupling
超音波共振でジャイロスコープを微小に擾乱させ、姿勢推定バイアスを生じさせてホバリングUAVの位置をずらす新しい攻撃手法を提案・検証した論文。
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著者: Shaocheng Luo, Ashir Raza, Haocheng Meng, David Hunt, Miroslav Pajic
分類: eess.SY, cs.RO
原文アブストラクト
UAV displacement attacks have traditionally relied on spoofing sensors that directly report position or translational motion, such as GNSS and optical flow. In this work, we introduce SonicNudge, a new attack primitive that instead targets the gyroscope and shows that low-level inertial errors can be transformed into controlled displacement of hovering or slow-moving UAVs. The attack exploits estimator--controller coupling: a small gyroscope perturbation by ultrasonic resonance can persist as an attitude-estimation bias, and the flight controller can convert this biased estimate into a shifted hover point. This behavior is especially relevant to UAV tasks that require hovering, station-keeping, slow approach, or precise final alignment, such as perimeter denial, inspection, docking, landing alignment, and close-proximity operation, where meter-scale position errors can be operationally meaningful. We analyze this attack primitive in a PX4-style flight stack and validate it through 81 simulation runs and more than 10 indoor/outdoor physical experiments, showing that displacement is governed by estimator weighting, bias observability, and closed-loop position correction. Our study suggests that UAV and vehicle-system security should look beyond direct navigation spoofing and pay closer attention to low-level inertial errors and estimator--controller coupling as a subtle but important attack surface.