物理エージェンティックAI:LLMによるロボットクルー編成のためのアーキテクチャ
Physical Agentic AI: An Architecture for Orchestrating a Robot Crew with LLMs
ロボット群をLLMで編成する際、計画と実行の間に検証層を設け、各動作をスキル・状態・制約に照らして確認するフレームワークを提案し、ドローンとUGVの探索・配送任務などで実証した。
著者: Xinyuan Liu, Eren Sadikoglu, Riana Chatterjee, Ransalu Senanayake
分類: cs.RO, cs.AI, cs.MA
原文アブストラクト
Agentic AI frameworks interpret open-ended task goals and decompose them into multi-step plans. Richer information about embodiment-specific capabilities, physical preconditions, and cross-robot coordination improves grounding, but does not eliminate infeasible, mistimed, or unsafe physical actions. Physical robot crews therefore require an explicit architectural interface between semantic planning and execution, where every planned action is verified against robot capabilities, system state, and workflow constraints before actuation. This paper introduces Physical Agentic AI, a framework for skill-grounded robot agent orchestration, in which each robot exposes a typed library of executable skills while a foundation model planner decomposes a task into phases and assigns each phase to a robot-skill pair. A Robot Orchestration layer exposes the skill library, robot state, named locations, and workflow contracts to a non-actuating Mission Planner, while a deterministic Robot Orchestrator validates and authorizes one skill at a time. We evaluate on a drone-UGV search-and-dispatch mission, where every mission in every condition is executed live in Gazebo, and on a humanoid-quadruped transportation task using hardware-equivalent skill interfaces plus two physical trials on a Unitree G1 and Go2. Varying planner knowledge and runtime enforcement independently, we find that retrieval raises skill grounding from 51% to 96% yet leaves informed planners dispatching 23-29% of faulted steps. Per-dispatch enforcement reduces false dispatch to 0% with no false blocks, and a held-plan ablation confirms that the gate, not plan variation, is responsible. Live execution makes the difference physical: without enforcement all eight injected faults crossed the orchestration boundary and six produced robot motion; with enforcement all eight were refused before motion.