Secure ROS 2システムのサプライチェーン攻撃：キーストア流出による自律プラットフォーム侵害の実証
Supply Chain Exploitation of Secure ROS 2 Systems: A Proof-of-Concept on Autonomous Platform Compromise via Keystore Exfiltration
トロイの木馬入りDebianパッケージでROS 2のセキュリティコマンドを改ざんし、キーストア認証情報をDNS経由で外部流出させて、自律走行車の制御・知覚メッセージを偽装できることを実証した。
著者: Tahmid Hasan Sakib, Yago Romano Martinez, Carter Brady, Syed Rafay Hasan, Terry N. Guo
分類: cs.CR, cs.OS, cs.RO, cs.SY, eess.SY
原文アブストラクト
This paper presents a proof-of-concept supply chain attack against the Secure ROS 2 (SROS 2) framework, demonstrated on a Quanser QCar2 autonomous vehicle platform. A Trojan-infected Debian package modifies core ROS 2 security commands to exfiltrate newly generated keystore credentials via DNS in base64-encoded chunks to an attacker-controlled nameserver. Possession of these credentials enables the attacker to rejoin the SROS 2 network as an authenticated participant and publish spoofed control or perception messages without triggering authentication failures. We evaluate this capability on a secure ROS 2 Humble testbed configured for a four-stop-sign navigation routine using an Intel RealSense camera for perception. Experimental results show that control-topic injections can cause forced braking, sustained high-speed acceleration, and continuous turning loops, while perception-topic spoofing can induce phantom stop signs or suppress real detections. The attack generalizes to any data distribution service (DDS)-based robotic system using SROS 2, highlighting the need for both supply chain integrity controls and runtime semantic validation to safeguard autonomous systems against insider and impersonation threats.