認証付き制御:自動運転車の検証可能な安全性のためのアーキテクチャ
Certified Control: An Architecture for Verifiable Safety of Autonomous Vehicles
複雑な知覚を検証する代わりに、制御器が安全性の証明書を生成し、小型で形式検証可能なランタイムモニタがそれを検査する新たな安全アーキテクチャを提案し、LiDARデータの証明書で実証した。
著者: Daniel Jackson, Valerie Richmond, Mike Wang, Jeff Chow, Uriel Guajardo, Soonho Kong, Sergio Campos, Geoffrey Litt, Nikos Arechiga
分類: cs.RO, cs.LO, cs.SE, cs.SY, eess.SY
原文アブストラクト
Widespread adoption of autonomous cars will require greater confidence in their safety than is currently possible. Certified control is a new safety architecture whose goal is two-fold: to achieve a very high level of safety, and to provide a framework for justifiable confidence in that safety. The key idea is a runtime monitor that acts, along with sensor hardware and low-level control and actuators, as a small trusted base, ensuring the safety of the system as a whole. Unfortunately, in current systems complex perception makes the verification even of a runtime monitor challenging. Unlike traditional runtime monitoring, therefore, a certified control monitor does not perform perception and analysis itself. Instead, the main controller assembles evidence that the proposed action is safe into a certificate that is then checked independently by the monitor. This exploits the classic gap between the costs of finding and checking. The controller is assigned the task of finding the certificate, and can thus use the most sophisticated algorithms available (including learning-enabled software); the monitor is assigned only the task of checking, and can thus run quickly and be smaller and formally verifiable. This paper explains the key ideas of certified control and illustrates them with a certificate for LiDAR data and its formal verification. It shows how the architecture dramatically reduces the amount of code to be verified, providing an end-to-end safety analysis that would likely not be achievable in a traditional architecture.