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Mobileye Receives ISO 21448-Compliant Inspection Certificate for AEB Development Process

Mobileye received an inspection certificate from TÜV SÜD for its AEB development process. An independent review confirmed compliance with ISO 21448, which addresses the safety of the intended functionality. The certificate covers development procedures, not the operational performance of AEB itself.

Key facts

  • Mobileye announced on October 22, 2026, that it had received its first inspection certificate from TÜV SÜD for AEB development.
  • The independent review confirmed that the AEB development process complies with ISO 21448 (SOTIF).
  • The assessment covers development procedures for identifying, assessing and reducing risks that can arise even when a system operates as designed.
  • The assessment covers Mobileye’s AEB development process, not AEB’s operational performance itself.
  • Mobileye said TÜV SÜD had previously issued a recommendation for the safety management system of an SAE Level 4 autonomous-driving system using Mobileye Drive.

What happened

Mobileye announced on October 22, 2026, that it had received an inspection certificate from TÜV SÜD for its development process for automatic emergency braking (AEB). An independent review confirmed compliance with ISO 21448, the international standard for safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF). Response.jp reported the announcement on November 10, 2026.

Why it matters

When assessing AEB safety, procedures for addressing hazards that can arise even when a system operates as designed are a separate focus from checking for malfunctions. The TÜV SÜD inspection certificate announced by Mobileye covers that development process; it does not certify braking performance or crash-reduction effectiveness. Automakers and safety assessment teams therefore need to distinguish the certificate’s scope from those measures.

Analysis

The certificate focuses not on how effectively AEB prevents collisions in practice, but on how the development process addresses hazards that can remain even when the system operates as designed. ISO 21448 (SOTIF) covers hazards arising not only from failures but also from the limits of a function’s performance and reasonably foreseeable misuse. The inspection certificate therefore cannot be interpreted as proof of AEB braking performance or crash-reduction effectiveness. The scope of the certificate must be distinguished from the results of the function itself. Mobileye said the review was limited to the AEB development process, while the safety process assessed is also relevant to the company’s development of driver-assistance and autonomous-driving technologies. This does not mean the AEB inspection certificate also certifies other functions or autonomous-driving systems. TÜV SÜD previously issued a “recommendation” for the safety management system of an SAE Level 4 system; that is different in scope and nature from the inspection certificate for the AEB development process. A related story in this newspaper reported that BMW Group and Embotech had moved a cumulative total of 1 million autonomous vehicles within factories, demonstrating the scale of operations in a specific environment Autonomous vehicles have made a cumulative 1 million trips inside factories. By contrast, Mobileye’s certificate concerns a third-party review of risk-management procedures in AEB development, not the number of vehicles in operation or their utilization rate. In evaluating autonomous-driving and driver-assistance technologies, process reviews, functional-performance validation and operational track records should be treated as distinct forms of evidence. At an industry level, how AEB developers incorporate the limits of sensors and perception systems, as well as a range of road conditions, into risk assessments also affects safety reviews by automakers and suppliers. Mobileye said the third-party review objectively assesses repeatable procedures, systematic risk assessment and the assignment of technical responsibilities. However, the announcement did not specify the test scenarios used in the review, individual AEB performance figures or the products and vehicle models covered by the certificate. The certificate’s scope, and how assessments of the development process connect with validation and real-world operation of individual products, will need to be examined.

Details

The review covered the AEB development process and the procedures for identifying, assessing and reducing hazards that could arise even when the system operates as designed. According to Mobileye, the risks covered include the limitations of sensors and perception systems, as well as conditions in the real-world environments where advanced driver-assistance systems operate. The certificate does not validate AEB’s operational performance itself. Mobileye said TÜV SÜD had previously issued a recommendation for the safety management system of an SAE Level 4 autonomous-driving system using Mobileye Drive. The current inspection certificate is limited to the AEB development process.

Sources

Translated from the Japanese original: /news/mobileye-aeb-kaihatsu-purosesu-de-iso-21448-tekigou-no-kensa-8279d3. The Japanese version is authoritative if they differ.